Pedestrian safety using SALi Technology

 

SUMMARY

This article is about "smart" car bumpers. They are filled with SALi, a compressible, elastic fluid.

They are soft for pedestrian impacts but stiffen up for impacts with other vehicles.

The aim of the PedSALi project was to build and test a prototype SALi filled bumper.

A British University received government funding to do the basic experiments. The automotive division of Dow Chemicals agreed to build and test a full sized bumper.

But an embarrassing management failure is currently holding up the fitting of soft bumpers to cars.

To hide their failings, one of the partners created false evidence to suggest that soft bumpers would not work.

We tell the whole story.
First, we explain how soft bumpers work, and then we show how the public was tricked into losing their protection.
Finally, we provide five appendices so that you can follow the clues and check the evidence for yourself.

We present some research data, but you can still follow the article, even if you ignore the graphs.

SUMMARY ENDS

 

How Britain almost made the world's roads safer.
(But an embarrassing case of research fraud prevented it from happening.)

 

 

Motor vehicles have become far safer for occupants over the last century.

Unfortunately, reductions in pedestrian casualties have not kept pace.

In the 1990’s, the European Commission tried to remedy this deficiency by drafting legislation that would require all new cars to be fitted with soft, pedestrian friendly bumpers.
 

Vehicle manufacturers were unhappy with this proposal, because soft bumpers would be less effective in low speed impacts with other vehicles and street furniture. And this in turn would cause insurance premiums to rise.

Show photograph of injury inflicted by a car bumper

 

But there is hope!

A British invention could keep insurance costs down and protect pedestrians

In 1997 Bill Courtney recognised that a car bumper filled with packages of Shock Absorbing Liquid (SALi) could solve this stiffness conundrum. That is, it could be a “smart bumper”; soft for pedestrian leg impacts, but stiff for other impacts. His early research findings were described in several research journals and magazines during the following three years.

(If you have come straight to this web page a more basic discussion of SALi Technology is available on our "What is SALi Technology? page.)

Figure 1. 1997, the first public hint that a “smart” bumper was feasible.

The following year an article in Auto Express magazine attracted the attention of the Automotive Division of Dow Chemicals.

In March 2000, the PedSALi consortium consisting of Dow Chemicals, Bill Courtney (under his trade name of Cheshire Innovation) and the University of Manchester won £250,000 of UK government funding to build and test a prototype bumper according to Bill’s designs.

How it works: a soft bumper for pedestrians
The following sketch represents a horizontal cross section through a SALi filled car bumper during a lower leg impact.

 

Figure 2, pedestrian impact. The SALi fluid flows to the sides of the impact zone. This reduces the stresses on the leg by allowing it to travel the full front to back distance of the bumper before coming to a halt.

Additional smart feature: A child’s leg has a smaller horizontal cross section than an adult leg, allowing the bumper to appear softer in accidents involving children.

 

Supporting evidence (1997)

By increasing the width of a SALi cushion it softens. In contrast, changing the width of a block of bumper infill foam does not change its properties. The graphs below show maximum accelerations during impact; maximum forces on the simulated leg increase proportionately.

This graph is extracted from [3].

 

Figure 18.   Impact energy absorbing performance of a block of expanded polypropylene foam, compared with SALi pads constructed using grease + granules of the same foam. The length of the block of foam did not affect the impact performance, provided that the length exceeded the diameter of the impact head, so the results for one length only are shown. In contrast, the maximum acceleration for the SALi pad declines as the length of the pad increases.

 

How it works: a stiff bumper for minor crashes

 

Figure 3, non-pedestrian impact. The SALi fluid is trapped and cannot flow to the sides of the impact zone. Consequently the bumper is stiff for non-pedestrian impacts.
Bonus smart feature: Viscous damping increases with compression rate, so the bumper stiffness and energy absorbing capacity increases with impact speed. The faster the car is travelling, the greater the impact protection.

 

Supporting evidence 1997 [3]

                The simulated leg impact tests are copied from above and the results for a simulated bumper-bumper impact added. These results show that SALi filled bumpers are “smart”. That is, they can be soft or stiff, depending on the type of impact

 

Figure 19. Simulated lower leg (1.4 kg mass) & bumper-to-bumper (15 kg mass) impacts

The broad conclusion suggested by the simulated bumper impact data, shown in Figure 19, is that a front bumper filled with a suitable formulation of SALi would behave like a soft foam filled bumper, for lower leg impacts, but like a stiff foam bumper, for bumper-to-bumper impacts. This difference in uniaxial stiffness behaviour, for different types of impact, could also be useful in solving the other conflict of stiffness problems identified by Clemo [3] and summarised in the introduction.

 

So, how come most people don’t know about soft bumpers?

The university research was mismanaged and the EU legislation was abandoned.
 

The mismanagement
(i)  there was an eighteen month gap between the PedSALi project being approved and the University research starting.

(ii) no usable research results were ever delivered to Dow.
Following a progress review in June 2004 a decision was made to wind up the PedSALi project.
Thirty three months after the delayed start of the University research, Dow had still not received any data for its computer modelling.
Consequently Dow had no evidence to encourage the rest of the automobile industry and its “window for commercial opportunity” closed.

 

Here is an extract from the terminal review.

 

Why did the EU abandon its legislation?
Apart from SALi, there was no technology available to solve the “conflict of stiffness” problem
Two months before the delayed start to the University research, the car makers began lobbying the European Commission, claiming that solving the problem was impossible.
The lobbying was successful because the PedSALi partners had no substantive evidence to show the Commission. The Directive was withdrawn in February 2003.

 

Would the smart bumper have worked?
The Manchester University researchers claimed in their project report to the Engineering and Physical Science Research Council (EPSRC) that SALi filled bumpers were ineffective.
This claim was backed up by research papers that they had presented at American conferences in Virginia Beach and San Diego, California.
[11, 12, 13.]

BUT

(i) The published research was invalid and carried out under protest from Dow and the inventor, Bill Courtney.

(ii) The false research was published in breach of a confidentiality agreement signed with Dow and Courtney.

(iii) News of the misleading publications and the trips to America only reached Bill after a confidential tip off from within the University.
 

Why was the published research invalid?

There were three main flaws in the published papers:
(i) they were limited to cylinder shaped “bumpers” which nobody in the automobile industry uses,
 
(ii) early tests had shown that cylinders were less effective than “D” shaped bumpers when filled with SALi,

(iii) the impact tests were done using elastic packaging. [12, 13.]
Elastic packing prevents the SALi from doing its job. Instead of the SALi being compressed, the package expands. The innocent reader of the research papers is tricked into thinking that SALi is ineffective.

British based researchers should not be going to America to trick their international colleagues in this way. British taxpayers should not be subsidising these trips and research trickery.

 

The hidden good research
Shortly before his surprise resignation, the first University research assistant produced valid research results using low stretch “D” shaped packaging. This good research, which showed a fivefold improvement in performance compared with the elastic packaging results, was withheld from publication. Consequently the EPSRC and the automobile industry were misled.
The good and bad research results are compared in Appendix 2 below.

The good experiments were repeated at Cardiff University six years later. The original results were confirmed and published. [4]

Figure 4 The selective publication of misleading results suggested that a SALi filled car bumper would be unacceptable to the automobile industry. This fake research was a smokescreen. "Proving" that the bumpers do not work “absolved” the academic researchers of any responsibility for the failure of the PedSALi project

In total, four misleading papers [11, 12, 13 and 14] were published in breach of the confidentiality clauses of the PedSALi collaboration agreement. Please see point 2 of “Checking our claims”, below, for advice on gaining access to these papers.

 

Figure 5. Bill suspected financial fraud had been committed so he requested copies of the relevant documents from the University. The information was withheld so he obtained his proof indirectly from the EPSRC.  

Q. What was the most blatant financial fraud?

A. The University claimed funding for a fictional event where the results of the PedSALi project were supposedly presented to the automobile industry. They also claimed funding for trips to Dow Chemicals UK headquarters, to present research results to Dow engineers. These visits were never made.

Bill Courtney was also offered public funding to attend the fictional events that would “prove” on paper that the PedSALi project had been completed. He did not claim.
 

Bill complained to the University after discovering the financial fraud. His evidence of fraud was dismissed by the University using a circular argument:

ð        The EPSRC had paid the University in full for its PedSALi research.

ð        Therefore the research was of an acceptable quality.

ð        Therefore any financial irregularities were permissible under EPSRC funding rules.

 

The "benefits" of hiding research and financial  fraud
The embarrassing failure of the PedSALi project was covered up and academic reputations were saved. 

Any suspicion that  scientists cannot be trusted was avoided.
 

Meanwhile lives continue to be ruined by crippling injuries and pedestrians still die on our roads.

 

A dark day in history
The aim of the PedSALi project was to save lives.
It’s a bitter irony, but the delayed University research started on the same day as the 9/11 attacks on America.

History may record that in the long run, the University mismanagement of the PedSALi project caused more pointless deaths than all of the terrorist attacks on America, Madrid, Mumbai, Bali, London and Norway.

Historians may also be tempted to draw comparisons between the PedSALi fiasco and “the worst industrial accident in history." This happened at Bhopal in India, in 1984. At the very least, 4,000 people died as a result of a chemical plant gas leak. This site is now owned by Dow Chemicals. (But in the PedSALi case, Dow was a victim, not a perpetrator. We cannot have one standard of ethics for industry, and another for academia.)

 

Checking our claims

1                   For a copy of Bill Courtney’s testimony, as sent to the Institute for Science, Ethics and Innovation, please contact
billcourtney [insert the “at” sign] lineone [insert a “dot”] net.
My apologies, this clumsy form of email address has been used to help foil  scavenging attacks.

2                Nullius in verba  "Trust no one"
In order to gain a balanced picture, consider asking the University  of Manchester for their version of events, including details of the unpublished PedSALi research and the June 2004 review quoted above.

3                   In contrast to PedSALi, workers at Cardiff University, operating on a shoestring budget have produced impressive results.
[Huw Davies et. al., Cardiff University School of Engineering, Pedestrian Protection using a Shock Absorbing Liquid (SALi) based Bumper System, ESV Conference, Stuttgart, June 2009, Paper Number 09-002.]
 

References

These references are a sub-set of  those on our What is Shock Absorbing Liquid (SALi) Technology? web page.
There are gaps in the numbering because the same reference numbers are used.

 

3       Courtney W A and Oyadiji S O (2000). Characteristics and potential applications of a novel shock absorbing elastomeric composite for enhanced crashworthiness. International Journal of Crashworthiness 5:4 (2000) 469-490.

4       Huw Davies et. al., Cardiff University School of Engineering, Pedestrian Protection using a Shock Absorbing Liquid (SALi) based Bumper System, ESV Conference, Stuttgart, June 2009, Paper Number 09-002.

11     S O. Oyadiji et. al., University of Manchester, Core property characterization for a shock absorbing composite, SAVIAC 75^th Symposium, 17-22 October 2004.

12     S O. Oyadiji et. al., University of Manchester, Characteristics of deformable cylindrical beams filled with a shock absorbing composite, SAVIAC 75^th Symposium, 17-22 October 2004

13     G. Georgiades et. al., Impact response of flexible cylindrical tubes filled with a shock absorbing composite, University of Manchester, SPIE Conference 7-10 March 2005.

14     G. Georgiades et. al., University of Manchester, Characterization of the Core Properties of a Shock Absorbing Composite, Journal of Engineering Materials and Technology, ASME, October 2007, Vol. 129, pages 497-504.

Appendix 1

The UK Department for Transport description of the PedSALi project appears at http://www.dft.gov.uk/rmd/project.asp?intProjectID=10434

A bitmapped copy of this page is reproduced below.

The key section relating to the importance of low stretch packaging has been highlighted.

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Home > Science and Research > RD > Programmes > DfT - Vehicle Standards and Engineering > (G) Foresight Vehicle > PEDestrian protection using Shock Absorbing LIquid technology (PEDSALI)

DfT Research Database

Project: PEDestrian protection using Shock Absorbing LIquid technology (PEDSALI)

Reference: C3/P35

Last update: 13/10/2003 09:58:29

Objectives

At the end of the project it is anticipated that, using Finite Element techniques, it will be possible to predict the performance characteristics of a SALi based shock-absorbing component. Physical testing be will used to confirm the predicted results and validate the model. The chosen materials will be assessed using FMEA techniques to ensure that any adverse effects, such as toxicity and corrosive properties, are recognised and evaluated.

Description

This highly innovative project is researching a new composite, impact energy absorbing material that can in effect, automatically alter its stiffness, to cope with different types of impact. At present it is being evaluated with respect to the reduction of serious and fatal pedestrian casualties as the result of road accidents, in line with DTLR targets.

The patented material being investigated is a Shock Absorbing Liquid (SALi) which consists of lots of small resilient elastomeric capsules immersed in a matrix liquid and stored in a strong flexible package. Upon impact, all of the capsules are compressed by the matrix liquid and the front face of the package deforms to the shape of the applied load. The compressive stiffness of SALi filled packages increases as the area of applied load is increased. Consequently, a suitable sized package would be soft for a small child’s head impact, but stiff for an adult head impact. If SALi filled packages are integrated into car bumper systems, then the bumpers will be soft for lower leg impacts, but stiff for low speed bumper-to-bumper impacts. This will help to make vehicles safer for pedestrian accidents, while keeping vehicle repair costs low.

The unusual cushioning properties of SALi can be illustrated by comparing its impact absorbing performance with that of a block of elastomeric closed cell foam.

The project is investigating the three parameters that influence the physical characteristics of a SALi filled impact absorber: the matrix liquid, the size and nature of the elastomeric capsules and packaging design.

The matrix liquid acts as a lubricant to facilitate the movement of the capsules and to transmit the hydraulic pressure changes when a load is applied. Additionally the liquid provides viscous damping when the steady state condition is disturbed due to its shear viscosity and bulk viscosity properties.

The capsules can vary from expanded polystyrene beads to bubble packing. The size distribution of the capsules need to be optimised in order minimise the total weight of the impact absorber, without compromising on impact absorbing performance.

The packaging provides a flexible leak-proof envelope to contain the liquid and capsules but, importantly, it must not stretch significantly during load application. Also, the package must not burst open and eject its contents during a violent impact. The size and shape of the package will affect impact energy absorbing performance.

Contractor(s)

University of Manchester
Oxford Road, Manchester, M13 9PL

Cheshire Innovation
17 Vale Road, Timperley, Altrincham, Cheshire, WA15 7TQ
0161 980 5191

Contract details

Cost to the Department: £44,200.00

Actual start date: 01 March 2001

Expected completion date: 30 September 2004

 

Note for the web page reader:
The Department for Transport (DfT) appointed Bill Courtney trading as Cheshire Innovation as the lead partner for the project. In this role he complained to the DfT and the Engineering and Physical Science Research Council (EPSRC) about fraudulent University research being done.

Appendix 2

The following comparison between the good unpublished research and the published bad research is extracted from a complaint letter to The Records Officer at the University of Manchester (7th March 2007) .

You can obtain a copy of the letter either from Bill Courtney, or from the University, under the terms of the Freedom of Information Act. This letter includes references to the primary source, where the good research was written up for  the PedSALi partners.

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Extract begins

 

Figure 6. Originally Figure 4 in Exhibit 11.
Compact car bumpers require good energy absorption during the early stages of indentation.  The published results falsely suggest that SALi is ineffective during the early stages of impact.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Figure 7.  Originally Figure 5 in Exhibit 11.
The published results give a false impression that a very bulky car bumper would be needed to meet the EU requirements.

 

The published results are even more misleading because the good results were obtained using a smaller sample.

If results for similar sized samples had been compared, the magnitude of the deceit would have been even more obvious.

Originally Figure 6 in Exhibit 11.

Figure 8. The first research assistant carried out tests on valid samples having a circumference of 220 mm. These results were not published.

The second research assistant carried out research using incorrectly packaged samples having a cross sectional circumference of 300 mm.

In spite of their smaller cross section, the correctly packaged devices still offer significantly better crash protection.

 

Extract from complaint letter to the University of Manchester ends

 

Questions and Answers

Q. Why did the EPSRC pay Manchester University for doing misleading research in spite of Bill Courtney's fraud warnings?

A. Using the The Freedom of Information (FoI) Act the reasons become clear.

(i) A fictional Technical Review of the research results was created by the University for the EPSRC.

This misled the EPSRC into believing that a foam alternative to SALi was available and that having reviewed the University research, Dow concluded that by comparison, “SALi bumpers were too heavy, too expensive and too complex”.

In reality, no such foam was available. 

Proof of deceit lies in the hospitals and mortuaries;  pedestrians are still being crippled and killed by stiff bumpers.
(Document IC 12 on the CDROM verifies that the EPSRC was deceived by the University.)

Dow played no part in this deceit and were unaware that the EPSRC had been fooled.
 

(ii) The EPSRC failed to pass Bill's fraud complaints on to their referees who assessed the University research for payment. (An admission of this failure is presented on the CD ROM.)
 

(iii) This careless behaviour by the EPSRC can be explained because additional trickery had been used against them.

The Department for Transport appointed Bill as lead partner for the PedSALi project, so his fraud warnings should have been taken seriously.
But he discovered that his name, contact details and key role was airbrushed out of financial claim documents submitted to the EPSRC.  (Copies of the airbrushed documents are presented on the CD ROM.)
Bill's role in the PedSALi project was also airbrushed out of all the PedSALi research papers seen by the referees. [You can check this for yourself by reading references 11, 12, 13 and 14 listed above.]

(iv) The University breached its FoI Act obligations by failing to release the incriminating documents to Bill.
 He eventually obtained them from the EPSRC. (Evidence that the University was aware that it had broken the law is presented  in Document C1 on the CD ROM.)

Q.  What did Bill Courtney do about this?

A. At about this time the University set up an Institute for Science, Ethics and Innovation, so Bill sent his evidence of fraud to the Institute. (Hard copy plus CD ROM.)
This resulted in the University carrying out a Formal Enquiry.  The EPSRC agreed to accept its findings

Q.  What  were the Formal Enquiry findings?

A. The Enquiry employed a neat trick that allowed the Panel to dismiss  all of Bill's fraud claims.
A scapegoat was selected for investigation. Other people who should have been investigated were then allowed to present evidence as as "independent" witnesses.
This enabled them to testify on behalf of the scapegoat and against Courtney.
During the period of the Enquiry Bill made two written protests about the use of this "trick", but his protests were ignored. (You can use the Freedom of Information Act to verify this.)

The Enquiry succeeded in further discrediting the reputation of SALi Technology by suggesting that SALi filled bumpers were a foolish invention that could not work.

For the innocent reader, this part of the Report seems to make sense. It records that Bill marketed SALi believing that it had a single Goldilocks stiffness that  was just right for all types of pedestrian impacts and car crashes. The Report also implies that Bill considered this Goldilocks stiffness was just right for use in car suspension systems.
A single stiffness material that meets all these different engineering needs is physically impossible. But recording that Bill believed this nonsense makes him  look incompetent by University and EPSRC engineering standards.

Q. How did the Panel support this nonsensical statement about Bill's "beliefs"?

A. The Report claimed that the results of the PedSALi and CrashSALi projects were scrutinized by "the Technical Committee of 6 engineers", "of more than 120 man-years of engineering experience" and that the Committee found the evidence did not back up Courtney's "beliefs".
 

BUT THIS "COMMITTEE" NEVER EXISTED
 

(i) One named member of the committee resigned from his University post and returned home to China two years  before the committee is supposed to have met.

(ii) Another named member, supposedly representing Dow Chemicals, has made a written statement denying his membership. (Document IC 12 on the CD ROM, as sent to the Institute for Science, Ethics and Innovation, and available from Bill Courtney.)

(iii) Bill has  not met anyone who admits to membership of this committee or has even heard of it.

(iv) Multiple Freedom of Information requests  have failed to produce any documents that refer to its existence.  (You can check this for yourself by making an FoI request to the University.)

(v) Even if the Committee had existed, its findings would have been invalid because the research on the PedSALi and CrashSALi projects was invalid and carried out under protest from Courtney. (For evidence that the CrashSALi research was invalid see Figure 2  on the CrashSALi web page.)
 

Implications for British science
 
(i) Prior to the Formal Enquiry, PedSALi was a "local" ethics problem restricted to crash research.
But the Report presented a fictional expert peer review in order to hide research fraud.
This creates a wider ethics problem by undermining trust in the peer review process across the whole of science.

(ii) These are difficult times for Universities. If a University gains competitive advantage by violating peer review it will be tempted to repeat the exercise.

 

Q. Could the Panel have made an innocent mistake?

A. The Panel had no excuse for undermining Bill's good name by making  false claims about him.
PedSALi had only won public funding because Bill's published research demonstrated that that SALi was a "smart" material that provided different levels of stiffness for different types of impact.

You can check the evidence presented to the Panel for yourself. [Figures 2, 3 and the supporting evidence above. Also, see the Department for Transport description of SALi filled bumpers in Appendix 1 above.]

Q.  Was this the only "mistake"?

A. The Formal Enquiry Report included a number of demonstrably false statements that damaged Bill's professional name. For example, it recorded false evidence that his dealings with the good UMIST researchers referred to in Appendix 3  below had been unethical because they breached (commercial) confidentiality. 
(The honest Business Manager could have punctured this libel in a sentence, but, in spite of Bill's written recommendation to the University Vice Chancellor, she was not interviewed by the Panel.)

The  Report also falsified dates. The most serious falsifications allowed the Report to hide:
(i) The truth about the critical delays in the University research start date.
(ii) The truth about the trips to America and presentation of fake research results in breach of contractual agreement.
 

Q.  How was all this misinformation hidden?

Q. The  format of the Report  lacked academic rigour. It had no indexing, referencing or footnotes. Consequently comparing statements recorded as "facts" with the primary source evidence was very difficult.

Q.  What did Bill do next?

A.  Bill tried to clear his name by sending evidence that the Panel's findings were corrupt to the  Institute for Science, Ethics and Innovation. He is partially sighted, so collating sufficient evidence was a very time consuming task.
The University refused to consider Bill's evidence because it was not received within 10 (ten) days of the Report being sent. This is discriminatory because the Report itself was delivered a year later than recommended by University of Manchester guidelines. (Meanwhile Bill ran out of funds and had to abandon his international patents relating to SALi.)
Since then Bill's emails to anyone at the University have bounced back as "undeliverable".

Q.  Who polices the Universities when this type of situation arises?

A. At an early stage in the problems, Bill Courtney's MP Graham Brady sought an answer to this question. The then Science Minister, Lord Sainsbury, ruled that he was unable to intervene and that  it was for Mr Courtney to resolve the problem himself.  [The Sainsbury letter is reproduced as Appendix 5 below.]

There appears to be no mechanism for dealing with Universities that refuse to address research fraud, except for the whistleblower to take action at his own cost.
 

And so the fight to expose University research fraud ends in a state of closedown.

But the consequences have not closed down: pedestrians are still being crippled and killed on our roads.

(Ironically, on 21st April 2010, Bill was knocked down by a car. He lost consciousness and cannot recall the incident. He has recovered from his injuries.)

 

You are challenged to check the facts
Bill Courtney will send you a CD ROM if you want to see all of the evidence submitted to the Institute for Science, Ethics and Innovation. This includes documents which verify that the Panel falsified dates.
 

You can then contact Manchester University and the EPSRC to cross  check Bill's claims. The Freedom of Information Act is a very powerful tool that will enable you to do this.

If you do go to the trouble of carrying out a rigorous investigation, you should compare the quality of the evidence you receive from both sides.

Bill Courtney’s submissions to the Institute for Science, Ethics and Innovation were supported by very detailed references, with a total of 110 (one hundred and ten) documents being supplied in all.

 In contrast, the Formal Enquiry Report findings have to be taken on blind trust.
The Report does not include copies of any of the evidence taken, any list of evidence, or other form of referencing. (Assuming that you receive the same Report as sent to Bill Courtney.)

 

Please contact us for a CD ROM.

 

Appendix 3

How the chance to develop a SALi research hub was wasted

Research into SALi Technology has been done at six British Universities, in China, the USA and Ireland.
 In the UK, only the PedSALi and CrashSALi projects have received direct public funding.

Prior to amalgamation in 2004, the Victoria University of Manchester (VUMAN) and the University of Manchester Institute for Science and Technology (UMIST) were separate institutions.
SALi research was carried out at both.

The publicly funded  research at VUMAN was fraudulent.  (See above and also the CrashSALi page.)

In contrast, low budget SALi research at nearby UMIST, was excellent.
[The good work  at UMIST was done by Professor Steve Reid, Dr John Harrigan and their Masters Degree students.]

Bill Courtney hoped that post amalgamation the good researchers would prevail and that this embryonic SALi research hub would expand.

To generate funding for the hub, he handed over commercial negotiating powers to VUMAN, and agreed to it to taking 50% of all future royalties.

Dow Chemicals estimated that the PedSALi project alone would bring about $(US) 1 million/ year to the new University.

In order to stimulate SALi research while ensuring that Manchester remained at the hub, Bill gave Manchester the right to grant research sub-licenses to other Universities. This was an important step because Bill wanted to scotch the myth that once a patent is granted, Universities are barred from investigating that area of technology.
 

(British University researchers have been known to throw our technology leads to other countries because they were ignorant of patent law. They genuinely believed that they were acting in the best interests of humanity by not filing patents, because this act would throttle innovation.)

But, as we tried to demonstrate at Manchester, this is not true. Patents are compatible with with open scientific development, provided that goodwill dominates commercial thinking.
Our marketing strategy was to encourage lots of Universities and businesses to develop and profit from SALi Technology. Instead of restricting licenses and being burdened with legal battles to protect our intellectual property, we preferred to share widely and collect many tiny royalty payments.

 

What happened in reality
Sadly, covering up fraud proved to be more tempting than developing a research hub. 

When Bill Courtney's MP asked for time to investigate the matter, the new University created a smokescreen by falsely pursuing Bill for debt recovery. (See CrashSALi page)

The good researchers and the honest Business Manager that Bill trusted with his intellectual property all left the new University. Bill wrote to the University Vice Chancellor urging him to contact them, to hear their side of the story, but his suggestion was not taken up.

The legal threats affected Bill's health, he became partially sighted and he ran out of funds. The SALi patents had to be abandoned and Bill's dedication to developing SALi Technology since 1986 came to nothing.

SALi Technology is now being developed in China, but the Chinese have refused to cooperate with Bill or a British University. (CrashSALi page)

 

Appendix 4

"Britain plc" is failing to learn from its mistakes

The failure of the SALi research hub teaches us an important lesson: when large sums of public money are involved, there is a proportionately large tendency to cover up embarrassing research fraud from which even Government Ministers and the EPSRC are not immune.

The Government is currently planning to invest £50 million in a university based graphene research hub. The EPSRC is helping to draw up the business plan.
Before investing this money, systems must be put in place to ensure that generating wealth for Britain is an achievable goal. 

The current evidence suggests that British University culture is not geared up to wealth creation.

4.1    Evidence from within Manchester University

(i) Here is the key clause from the  profit sharing agreement between Cheshire Innovation (Bill's trading name) and MIL, the University business arm.

 

"Britain plc" lost out because Cheshire Innovation was locked into a legally binding agreement that gave Manchester University the sole authority to negotiate with industry on its behalf.
Meanwhile, the University was hiding fraud by generating "evidence" that SALi was ineffective and that Bill himself was professionally incompetent.
This is a permanent loss for Britain because Bill has used up his funds trying to clear his name. Consequently the expansive international patent protection for SALi had to be abandoned.

(ii) The graphene own goal
During the fraudulent research cover-up, lessons were rapidly forgotten.

Manchester University threw away the chance to file at least four core patents relating to graphene.

First patent: An application should have been filed to protect the  method for manufacturing graphene sheets by using a tool to peel off an atom thick layer of carbon from a block of graphite. The method required the use of strong adhesive forces that exceeded the weak cohesive forces between layers of graphene, so a detailed patent specification could have been written.
Another 3 patents, maybe more: Patents do not demand rigorous research proof, they only require inventive novelty. Patent applications linking the mechanical, optical, electrical and other physical properties of graphene to its novel laminar crystalline structure should have been filed as soon as their possibility was suspected.
Filing patents is free and they remain totally secret until a search fee has been paid. Even with the patentee's agreement, it is at least a year before the application is published. This allows researchers to make wild guesses about their discoveries without risking their professional reputations.
Bill Courtney knows that this patenting formula works because, during his time as a research fellow at Manchester University, (where he wrote patents on behalf of the University), he used it to gain international patent protection for SALi Technology.

Using the sub-licensing strategy pioneered by Courtney at Manchester a few years earlier, the granting of  patents would not have hampered the international development of graphene technology. In fact it would have had the reverse effect for Britain plc; Manchester would have become the hub for the dissemination of graphene knowledge because it would uniquely hold the contact details for its sub-licence holders.

Q. Are SALi and graphene similar technology breakthroughs?

A. Well, no and yes. Graphene has a far wider range of potential applications, so it is almost arrogant to refer to SALi in the same sentence.
Nevertheless, there are some intriguing similarities. In both cases the basic building materials have been known for many years.  Graphene derives its unique set of properties from a matrix pattern at the atomic level and SALi does something similar at a naked eye scale. Both were discovered in Manchester and researched at the same University.

Bill Courtney discovered  SALi in 1986, two decades before the 2004 graphene breakthrough.

The mutual tragedy is this:  
By 2003, when research fraud brought SALi development to a close, a small team of honest people in the business arm of the University had spent several years collaborating with Bill. They had developed new skills, converting SALi into a patented, potentially lucrative British business opportunity.  Manchester was ideally poised to tap into the far greater potential of graphene, but the SALi cover-up damaged its development.
 

The Chinese are now independently developing SALi and the first commercial graphene products are coming from the USA.

Britain has learned nothing from its long history of leading the world in invention, then leaving others to profit.